The Special Relationship UK and US

The Special Relationship UK and USThe marches modified human kin is used to describe the Anglo-the Statesn relations soon after the Second adult male War when Britain and the unify States d eveningloped a close wor queen mole rat kin and co-operated extensively in terms of military on the wholeiance, intelligence, diplomacy, nu put one over affairs and to a fault in cultural and intellectual life. The birth amidst President Roosevelt and gush Minister Churchill established the beginning of an extraordinary consanguinity in g everywherenmental history. The term fussy family was coined by Winston Churchill in his Sinews of Peace look at ( super Cly called the Iron Curtain speech) at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, on 5 serve 1946.Arguably, a period in which both Britain and the linked States had a lot to increase from profound cooperation was the late 1940s.Britain had been weakened by the effects of the War and demand financial assistance to restore its indu stries and rebuild its cities. The United States on the new(prenominal) hand was facing Soviet threat and was restricted by isolationistic tendencies and domestic dissent on the domestic political front. Gallagher (2004110) states that this period was a time when London and Washington recognized the need to maintain the soma of unity that had been so important during the fight against Japan and Nazi Germany.The Anglo-the Statesn relationship had several distinctive features. In the axis of intelligence, the United States and Britain shared a wide range of information than either does among its other allies particularly during the Second macrocosm War and thereafter restored under the 1948 UKUSA stipulations of which Dickie (1994260) describes as the most fruitful joint venture of the Anglo-American partnership, with extraordinary dividends for both sides. This agreement set up the signals intelligence (SIGINT) apparatus of the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In the same vein, British intelligence operatives deviseed with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and functi singled from the US embassy in London (Dumbrell, 2001).Britain and the United States likewise shared numerous bilater supporter symmetrical defensive measure links left everyplace from the Second World War. Colman (2004) states that In December 1941, the cooperation between the British and American governments reached its anthesis with the signing of the Anglo-American compact and the creation of the combined chief of staff which is a collaborated British and American military command which presides over all Anglo-American operations. The NATO alliance, focused on the defence of Western Europe had Britain and the United States as its leading members. The formation of NATO in 1949 had the British Army of the Rhine (BOAR) as the Britains land force contribution with over 50,000 phalanx stationed in Germany in 1962 (Colman, 2004).The special relationship res ulted in the Atlantic Charter of 1941, which is a set of guiding principles at the coming of quiescence targeted to govern relations between states. The Anglo-American relationship was unlessed streng whereforeed by stinting connections, atomic and nuclear matters, and considering the fact that both countries share a common heritage and a common language. It is also pertinent to note the in-person relationships that existed between about American Presidents and British Prime Ministers, significantly Churchill (whose amaze was American) and Roosevelt and years later between Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. The extent of the unity of purpose and cooperation which existed between the British and American governments during the Second World War remains one of the most phenomenal aspects of that period.However, the special relationship was intensely strain during the Suez crisis of 1956 and elevated questions as to how special the relationship rightfully was in reality. This essay seeks to turn to how the Suez crisis impaired the UK, USA special relationship and to decipher if the relationship was really that special.The Suez crisis of 1956 capitally strained the relationship between Britain and America the crisis exposed their differences to colonialism, collectivism and their contrasting stakes in the nerve center East. Also, the Anglo-American Alliance and Britains position as a great power was in ruins during this period.The Suez provide was a sea route of vast strategic importance to Britain. As the main importee of the British Empire it connected Britain with India and the pacific. The major figures involved were Anthony enlightenment, Britains Prime Minister, US electric chair Dwight D. Eisenhower, his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles and the Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser.The Suez Canal was the focal point of Britains military presence in the easterly Mediterranean especially since Britain control of Egypt since the 1880s ( Dimbleby and Reynolds, 1988). Eden, who was Churchills successor as height Minister argued that the Canal was Britains great gallant lifeline, particularly for oil (The Economist, 27 July 2006). For the Egyptians on the other hand, the Canal Zone was a constant monitor lizard of the despised British occupation and efforts to terminate Britains presence in the Canal Zone were escalated especially after the military coup of 1952 which ousted the luxurious king Farouk. It became pretty difficult to operate the supply as Egyptians boycotted British barter and attacked British personnel. (Dimbleby and Reynolds, 1988)The British government came to a decision in 1954 to quash the Canal Zone by June 1956. Eden hoped that this decision would foster a new relationship with Egypt and also since the American and British government agree to financially support Nasser with a loan of $70 Million towards the procural of the Aswan High Dam to provide better irrigation and electric power to Eg ypt. (Dimbleby and Reynolds, 1988)However, contempt the loan offered by Britain and America, Nasser was not forthcoming, he undermined the Baghdad pact, a regional defence organization which was British-led and rejected the Anglo-American peace treaty plans with Israel. His ambition was to politically resurrect the whole Arab world against colonialism and opposition of great powers exploitation of the in-between East. Dimbleby and Reynolds (1988) state that while accepting the loan from the Anglo-American government, Nasser ordered arms from the Soviet married couple through and through Czechoslovakia.By March 1956, the Anglo-American governments could no longer endow up with Nasser Eden condemned and compared Nasser with Mussolini and Hitler of the 1930s, adding that the Egyptian leaders objective was to become a Caesar from the Gulf to the Atlantic, and to kick us out of it all (Shuckburgh, 1987327). Dulles the US secretary of state announced on 19 July 1956 that the Aswan loa n offered to Egypt had been cancelled. Nasser retaliated on 26 July 1956 by declaring to an amazed world the nationalization of the Suez Canal, stressing that Egypt would be in charge of the canal and proceeds used to finance the Aswan dam.Britain placed scotch and political sanctions on Egypt as the British interest was in flagitious jeopardy, the British government was ready to use force to bring Nasser vanquish. Eden tried to convince Eisenhower on the removal of the Nasser government for a regime friendlier to the West. However, Eisenhower was as unreceptive to Britain, just as Britain had been to America at the peak of the Dien Bien Phu crisis in Vietnam in 1954 (Louis and Owen, 1989)America did not have much at stake in respect to the nationalization of the Suez Canal as Britain did and as such believed that diplomacy was the best option, Dulles on 2nd October told a news conference that under the North Atlantic Treaty, Suez was not a part of Americas obligations to her A llies. (Dimbleby and Reynolds, 1988)Britain sort alliance with France as co-owners of the canal. Israel was encouraged to escalate the spring raids in Sinai and invade Egypt signalling another Arab-Israeli War thereby posing a threat to the Suez Canal. Britain and France would exploit the opportunity as a pretext to deputise and secure the Suez Canal (The Economist, 27 July 2006). The American government was completely unplowed in the dark concerning these preparations for action.Eden concluded that although the Americans were in principle not happy with Britains use of force against Egypt to recover the canal, they would not completely even off Britain. Outright American antagonism was least expected and that is exactly what Britain was set about with.A twelve hours ultimatum was issued by London and Paris for Israel and Egypt to retreat from the canal which was to be taken over by British and French forces. Israel recognised this ultimatum while Egypt rejected it and on the 31 st of October 1956, the British and French finished Egyptian airfields.Eisenhower was infuriated by the obvious deception of his closest ally and Britains un leaveingness to revert to diplomacy. Eisenhower, who was completely kept in the dark, felt abruptly betrayed by his erstwhile allies, he told his aides Ive just never seen great powers make such a complete mess and botch of things (Dimbleby and Reynolds, 1988214). He was determined to bring the whole enterprise to a stop. The timing of Britains actions was further unfortunate for Eisenhower who was up for re-election on 6 November 1956 of which his intention was to win as the incumbent peace president, and it was pertinent he showed his capability of controlling worldwide diplomatic and military conflicts. As such, Eisenhower could not afford to get caught up in a foreign complicated situation of no mail interest to America.America proved adept working via the United Nations and introduced a resolution calling for a ceasefi re and desists from the use of force by all UN members. This resolution was passed by a majority of 64 to five votes, Russia choose with the US (Dumbrell, 2001). Britain on the other hand was severely criticised from all nearly the world instigated by the Americans. Apart from publicly criticising Britain and giving her a frozen shoulder, Rachman (2001) highlights that the Americans further used the diminishing value of the wash up sterling as a weapon to evict Britain from Egypt. A run on the pound ensued under US pressure as foreign holders of the sterling began to top out their holdings. America attacked the fragile economy of Britain and prohibited the IMF to offer pinch loans to Britain until the invasion was called off.The British Treasury envisaged an imminent financial collapse and on 7th November, Britain declared a ceasefire, stopped the operation and gave in to America demands. The French though furious were obliged to agree as their troops were under British author ity, many of Britains illusions about the special relationship was done for(p) and undermined by the Suez crisis of 1956.This is not the first time the Anglo-American relationship was severely strained and certainly not the last the Indo-China crisis and the difference of opinions over Formosa are some examples. In reference to the special relationship in the Middle East, Ashton (1996113) argues as to the reason why the Middle East proved to be such a fertile ground for conflict between the two powers was hardly that their interests here often failed to coincide. Indeed, the US Cold War aims of containing the Soviet Union clashed with Britains tendency towards the Middle East in terms of the protection of its imperial interest. This difference in Anglo-American relations produced conflicts following the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian oil follow in 1951 by the Iranian Premier Mohammad Mossadeq.The Anglo-American opposition further resurfaced in 1955 when Britain adhered to t he Baghdad pact. Dulles, discussing the pact with Eisenhower asserted that the British have taken it over and run it as an instrument of British policy that has drawn great deal upon it a tremendous amount of criticism (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1991).The Anglo-American scrap as a result of failure of interest to coincide was also apparent over the tension in the South-Eastern Arabia territory of Buraimi. Anthony Eden, in January 1957 the eve of his resignation as Prime Minister remarked It may be that the United States attitude to us in the Middle East dates from our refusal to give up Buraimi (Smith, 2008).As highlighted by Petersen (2000), Hoover the Assistant secretary of State responded to the Anglo-American whirl over Suez by stating that this cleavage had gone a great bus deeper than people imagined. It had Started a long time ago even forwards Suez and as far back as the Buraimi incident (Petersen, 200072). Petersen further argued that the Buraimi crisis presented Anglo-American diplomats with a conflict of interest which eventually contributed to the rupture of the Atlantic Alliance during the Suez crisis of 1956 (Petersen, 199272)The British was hurt the most by the Suez crisis, which resulted in a break down in relations between Britain and America, a near crippling of the pound up sterling and in the resignation of Eden the conservative Prime Minister, as his health wrecked. According to Freiberger (1992), the crisis further exploded the lingering imperial pretensions of Britain and quickened the license of its colonies e.g. Ghana and Nigeria. Britain learnt from the Suez crisis that it would never be able to take actions independently of America again as British politicians are contented to play assist fiddle to America.If there is a special relationship between Britain and America, then it is a one way street with Britain hanging on to the coat-tails of the United States. Suez showed the French that perfide Albion could no t be relied on as Britain always places its special relationship with America above its European interests.ConclusionHistory shows that international relations vary with the strength and character of respective leaders and that applies to the relationship between the United States and Great Britain. In the aftermath of Suez, Britains position became somewhat untenable to act like a superpower, her position as a world power began to decline with the rise of America. The Suez crisis made it very clear to the US that it has to take more prominence in crisis of the Middle East. whizz could easily wonder if the United States actively developed a strategy to replace Britain as a dominant power in the Middle East or if the US sacrificed its allies with the ambition of gaining total domination of the region.However, there have been recent controversies regarding the existence of the special relationship. According to a recent report by the Commons foreign affairs committee, Americas relat ionship with Britain is not more special than its relationship with its other main allies, and the term special relationship does not portray the modern Anglo-American relationship. (Times online, 28th March 2010)In this report, a committee of influential MPs state that Britains special relationship with the USforged by Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt in the Second World Warno longer exists (Times online, 28th March 2010). Does this mean that the relationship is dead? Relying on the traditional model of bilateral partnership will certainly doom this relationship to obscurity.Strengthening Britains leadership within the EU and a renewed partnership within multilateral institutions are meaty for a strong and vital special relationship in the twenty-first degree Celsius. Burwell (2010) echoed that the fundamental element of the special relationship in the 21st century must be partnerships that surpass the bilateral UK-US relationships. The Anglo-American special relationship should work towards a partnership with multilateral institutions to take on global challenges through diplomacy and political influence.